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MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY
AFTER HYMOWITZ AND CONLEY:
EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER
Christopher J. McGuire*
After recent court decisions,' roughly 70 million Americans2
reside in states that recognize market-share liability.3
California, Florida, and New York, three of the four most
populous states,4  have adopted the theory in some
form-California in 1980,' New York in 1989,6 and Florida
in 1990. 7  Although many commentators have written on
market-share liability since the California Supreme Court
crafted the theory in 1980,8 another examination is appropriate
* Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 24,
1991. B.A., Williams College, 1986; M.P.A., The Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1988; J.D., University of Michigan
Law School, 1991. As an editor, I am particularly aware of the contributions of
others to the writing process and wish to express my thanks to: Elizabeth Camp
McGuire, for urging me to work on my own writing; Julie Crockett and David
Hackett, my Note Editors, for their advice and encouragement; and several other
people for assorted editing and suggestions-Ellen Marks, Eric Richardson, Tom
Byrne, Mark Phillis, Michael Mishlove, Zachary Wright, and Roger Wynne. Any
remaining errors, of course, are my own.
1. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487,539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S.
944 (1989); see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342
N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
2. See Public Information Office, Economics & Statistics Admin., Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Press Release CB90-232 (table) (Dec. 26, 1990)
[hereinafter Press Release] (reporting the following 1990 census population counts:
California, 29.8 million; New York, 18.0 million; Florida, 13.0 million; Wisconsin, 4.9
million; and Washington, 4.9 million); Barringer, Census Bureau Places Population
at 249.6 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1, B6, cols. 3-6 (table)
(reporting the same figures).
3. Roughly, market-share liability holds a manufacturer of a fungible product
liable to those injured by the product in proportion to the manufacturer's share of the
market for the fungible good. See infra Part I.
4. See Press Release, supra note 2 (table); Barringer, supra note 2, at B6, cols.
3-6 (table).
5. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
6. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
7. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
8. See, e.g., Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections
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because recent New York and Florida cases each raise new
questions concerning the power of courts to impose liability
through novel tort theories.
This Note surveys the development of market-share liability
and examines the limits on the power of state and federal
courts to impose liability on defendants through market-share
liability. Part I examines briefly the development of market-
share liability in the early 1980s. It then explores how the
New York Court of Appeals extended market-share liability in
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly9 and explores this case's ramifications.
Part I also draws on a recent Florida case, Conley v. Boyle
Drug Co.,1" for further insight into the problems surrounding
market-share liability litigation. Part II argues that jurisdic-
tional limitations, such as standing to sue in federal court and
the requirements for in personam jurisdiction over defendants,
should pose significant restraints on judicial power to apply
the most expansive versions of market-share liability. Part III
urges that Congress enact a law, as an appropriate exercise of
its power under the commerce clause, to limit the power of
states to create theories of liability that can significantly
interfere with interstate commerce.
on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Schwartz & Mahshigian, Failure to
Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 941 (1985); Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstilbestrol: The Unidentifi-
able Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591 (1990); Note, Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories: Is Market Share Liability the Best Remedy to the DES Controversy?,
18 CAL. W.L. REV. 143 (1982) (authored by Richard A. Marshack) [hereinafter Note,
Best Remedy]; Note, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to
DES Causation, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1179 (1981) (authored by Richard P. Murray)
[hereinafter Note, DES Causation]; Note, Market Share Liability and DES-Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories: Square Pegs in Round Holes, 13 CONN. L. REV. 777 (1981)
(authored by Mark V. Connolly) [hereinafter Note, Square Pegs]; Comment, Into the
Quagmire: Washington Adopts Market Share Liability in DES Cases, 21 GONZ. L.
REV. 199 (1985/86) (authored by Sharon Novak) [hereinafter Comment, Into the
Quagmire]; Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem,
94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981); Comment, DES: The Patchwork Quilt of Tort Law, 2
N. ILL. U.L. REV. 369 (1982) (authored by Sharon C. Brennan); Comment, Market
Share Liability: Is California a Mere Gadfly on the Products Liability Scene or Is It
a Harbinger of a National Trend?, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 129 (1984) (authored by
Thomas H. Winslow); Casenote, California Expands Tort Liability Under the Novel
"Market Share" Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1011
(1981) (authored by N. Denise Taylor) [hereinafter Casenote, California Expands Tort
Liability]; Case Comment, Refining Market Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 33 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1981) (authored by Robert A. Kors) [hereinafter
Case Comment, Refining Market Share Liability].
9. 73 N.Y.2d 487,539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989).
10. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
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I. MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY: THE FIRST TEN YEARS
Although the various forms of market-share liability all
originated in the context of diethylstilbestrol1" (DES) product-
liability lawsuits,12 one should not conclude that the theory
of recovery is limited to a single type of product. Rather, the
theory encompasses a particular set of defendant identifica-
tion problems. 3  Courts have applied the market-share
theory in cases dealing with vaccines,14 asbestos,5 and
11. Doctors prescribed the drug diethylstilbestrol to prevent miscarriages.
Downey & Gulley, Theories of Recovery for DES Damage, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 170
(1983). For a basic discussion of the drug's origins, testing, and uses, see id. at 168-
72; Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 963, 963-67 (1978) (authored by Naomi Sheiner).
12. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S.
944 (1989); see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342
N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
13. Courts have recognized explicitly that the scope of market-share liability may
extend beyond DES cases. See, e.g., Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49
-(noting that "this method of recovery could apply in situations which are factually
similar to the DES cases"). Commentators also have made this observation. See, e.g.,
Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 8, at 941-42 (recognizing DES cases as a subset
of the cases involving defendant identification problems).
14. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1342-43 (C.D. Cal.
1987). If the allegation merely asserts that a particular dose of a vaccine was
defective, however, a market-share theory will be inapplicable. Sheffield v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 876 (1983). Another court has
refused to apply market-share liability to cases involving vaccines, arguing that it is
contrary to the public policy of providing them. See Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories,
Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 116 N.J. 155, 188, 561 A.2d 511, 528 (1989).
15. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359-60 (E.D.
Tex. 1981) (allowing discovery to proceed based upon a market-share theory of
liability), rev'd in part on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts,
however, have consistently rejected the use of market-share liability for determining
liability or apportioning damages in asbestos cases. See, e.g., Hannon v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D. La. 1983); Starling v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 186-87 (S.D. Ga. 1982). Generally, they reject it because
plaintiffs fail to assert which of the different types of asbestos was responsible for
their injuries. In particular, the plaintiffs fail to establish that they were injured by
a fungible product. See, e.g., Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 200 Cal.
App. 3d 250, 255-56, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36-37 (1988); see also Schwartz & Mahshigian,
supra note 8, at 959 n.96. Courts have found that these failures by plaintiffs are
fatal to their market-share theory claims because different companies have varying
market shares of each of the different types of asbestos. See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex
Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 392-94 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
643 F. Supp. 1454, 1462-65 (W.D. Pa. 1986), affd without op. 826 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir.
1987); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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plasma products.16 Lawyers have advocated market-share
liability's expansion to products as disparate as multipiece tire
rims" and electrical heat tape." Commentators have sug-
gested applying the theory to combat air pollution,' 9 in partic-
ular acid rain,20 and to a variety of other circumstances. 2'
A. The Development of Market-Share Liability
in the Early 1980s
In the early 1980s, courts developed three different versions
of market-share liability. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
22
the California Supreme Court developed the original theory.
No court outside California, however, has adopted the com-
plete Sindell rationale.23 Four years later, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,24 borrowed from
the Sindell decision and developed a distinct theory of liability
that included market shares in apportioning damages.25
Shortly thereafter, the Washington Supreme Court, in Martin
16. See Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, Div. of Miles, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 193, 194
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (applying market-share liability to Factor VIII, a blood plasma
product used by hemophiliacs).
17. See Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (D.S.D.
1984); Tirey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 33 Ohio Misc. 2d 50, 51, 513 N.E.2d 825,
827 (C.P. Montgomery County 1986); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 344
Pa. Super. 9, 24-27, 495 A.2d 963, 971-72 (1985).
18. See Kinnett v. Massachusetts Gas & Elec. Supply Co., 716 F. Supp. 695, 697
n.7 (D.N.H. 1989).
19. See Note, Pollution Share Liability, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 297, 312-20 (1984)
(authored by Ellen Friedland) (suggesting a variation on market-share liability).
20. See Comment, Proof of Causation in a Private Action for Acid Rain Damage,
36 ME. L. REV. 117, 141-50 (1984) (authored by Patrick J. Scully).
21. See Endress & Sozio, Market Share Liability: A One Theory Approach
Beyond DES, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1, 18-24 (advocating expansive use of the market-
share liability theory).
22. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); see also infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing Sindell).
23. One court outside of California has followed part of the Sindell decision
without altering California's version of market-share liability in some fashion. See
McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983). Even so, the
McElhaney court mentioned Sindell only in denying a motion for summary judgment
and discussed only the identification aspects and not the apportionment aspects of
the decision. See id. at 270-71.
24. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); see also
infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (discussing Collins).
25. 116 Wis. at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
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v. Abbott Laboratories,26 developed a third version of market-
share liability27 that was adopted in other states. 28 A brief
examination of these three theories is useful to understand
some of the issues involved in suits involving indeterminate
defendants.
1. The California variation-In Sindell, the plaintiff alleged
that she developed a malignant bladder tumor and adenosis as
a result of exposure to DES before birth.29 She sought
damages from five drug companies that manufactured DES
during the period when her mother ingested the drug.3" The
plaintiff stated that she was unable to identify the particular
manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother.3
Although the court rejected three theories of liability
proposed by the plaintiff,32 it nevertheless found that, given
the circumstances of the case, a modified version of the rule of
Summers v. Tice33 should be applied.34 The court justified
26. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); see also infra notes 57-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Martin).
27. 102 Wash. at 602-07, 689 P.2d at 381-83.
28. Two other courts adopted the Martin rationale. See McCormack v. Abbott
Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass. 1985); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570
So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990). An Illinois state court of appeals also adopted the Martin
rationale, but was later reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Smith v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 18-20, 527 N.E.2d 333, 344-45 (1988), rev'd, 137 Ill. 2d 222,
560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
29. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594-95, 607 P.2d 924, 926, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 134, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
30. Although ten companies were named in Sindell's original complaint, only
five-Abbott Laboratories, E.R. Squibb & Sons, the Upjohn Company, Eli Lilly & Co.,
and Rexall Drug Company-were involved in the appeal to the California Supreme
Court. Id. at 596 n.4, 607 P.2d at 927 n.4., 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.4. The action was
dismissed or the appeal abandoned on various grounds as to the other five
defendants. Id. In one particular situation, the action was dismissed against the
defendant because the defendant demonstrated that it had not manufactured DES
during the period when the plaintiffs mother ingested the drug. Id.; see also id. at
602, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
31. Allegedly, doctors customarily prescribed DES by its generic rather than its
brand name, and pharmacists filled orders with whatever brand was in stock. Id. at
595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Therefore, it is possible that the
plaintiffs mother actually ingested the product of more than one manufacturer.
32. The court rejected alternative liability, concert of action, and enterprise
theory as bases for recovery. See id. at 598-610, 607 P.2d at 928-35, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 136-143. I will not elaborate on this point because it has already been discussed
extensively. See, e.g., Note, Square Pegs, supra note 8, at 784-99; Comment, Into the
Quagmire, supra note 8, at 212-24; Casenote, California Expands Tort Liability,
supra note 8, at 1021-31.
33. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-87, 199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1948) (recognizing what is now called
the theory of "alternative liability" and applying it in a case in which two hunters
negligently shot at a third hunter, who was struck with only a single bullet).
34. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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its holding that the plaintiff had a cause of action on the basis
of three public policy arguments: (1) between an innocent
plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the
cost of the injury; (2) defendants are better able to bear the
cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective
product; and (3) the manufacturer is in the best position to
discover and prevent defects and to warn of harmful effects.35
To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff must join as defen-
dants in the action the manufacturers of a substantial
share31 of the DES that her mother might have taken, other-
wise known as the "appropriate" market.37 After the plaintiff
establishes that the defendants were negligent or strictly
liable in their manufacture of the product, the burden of proof
shifts to defendants to exculpate themselves.38
In decisions following Sindell, California courts clarified the
cause of action in three respects. First, the courts stated that
the substantial share requirement is not met when only ten
percent of the relevant market is joined in an action.39
Second, resolving a point of considerable controversy,4 ° the
California Supreme Court stated that under a market-share
liability theory, liability among the defendants is several but
35. Id.
36. In choosing the substantial share requirement, the court noted that it was
not setting the threshold as high as the 75 to 80 percent of the market suggested by
one author. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (citing Comment, supra
note 11, at 996 (1978) (authored by Naomi Sheiner)). The plaintiff in Sindell alleged
that the defendants produced 90% of the DES market, id., which would easily meet
this requirement if it were proven at trial. Other plaintiffs have failed to meet the
substantial share requirement, a requirement that the court acknowledges has not
been established as a specific percentage of the market. See Murphy v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 684, 710 P.2d 247, 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447, 455 (1985)
(holding that a plaintiff fails to meet the substantial share requirement when only
10% of the market is joined).
37. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court
readily acknowledged the practical problems in defining markets and determining
market shares but dismissed them as "largely matters of proof." Id. at 613, 607 P.2d
at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
38. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
39. Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 684, 710 P.2d 247, 255,
221 Cal. Rptr. 447, 455 (1985).
40. Some people reading Sindell believed that it made defendants jointly liable.
See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 601-02, 689 P.2d 368, 380-
81 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 190 n.9, 342 N.W.2d 37, 48 n.9,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Note, Best Remedy, supra note 8, at 163. Other
people believed the decision did not impose joint liability. See, e.g., Fischer, supra
note 8, at 1635-36; Robinson, supra note 8, at 725. Some commentators decided that
it was simply unclear. See, e.g., Note, DES Causation, supra note 8, at 1194-96; Case
Comment, Refining Market Share Liability, supra note 8, at 941-42.
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not joint.4" Third, the court in which California's DES cases
are consolidated for trial accepted the parties' stipulation
defining the appropriate market for analysis as the national
market of DES for pregnancy use, thus removing determi-
nation of the relevant market from the facts of each individual
case.
42
2. The Wisconsin variation-Four years after Sindell, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,"'
confronted a similar claim. The Wisconsin court, however,
rejected the particular market-share theory adopted in
Sindell.
The court declined to adopt the Sindell theory for three
reasons. The "primary" factor for not adopting the California
court's theory was "the practical difficulty of defining and
proving market share,"" which the court characterized as "a
near impossible task if it is to be done fairly and accurately."
46
The court also objected to inflating proportionately the damages
of the defendants to ensure that a plaintiff could recover fully
in a case in which some defendants were absent,47 an interpre-
tation of Sindell that later proved erroneous.4' Furthermore,
the court believed that the determination of market shares
would involve a "waste of judicial resources."49
Yet, the court did find some value in the market-share
theory. 0 The Wisconsin scheme includes market share as "a
relevant factor in apportioning liability among defendants."5'
Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly intended its
theory of recovery to apply to products other than DES. 2
41. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1072-75, 751 P.2d 470, 485-87,
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 426-28 (1988).
42. See General Order No. 12, at 8, In re DES Litigation, No. 830-109 (Cal. Sup.
Ct., City and County of San Francisco Aug. 16, 1985).
43. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
44. Id. at 189, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
47. See id. at 190 n.9, 342 N.W.2d at 48 n.9.
48. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1072-73, 751 P.2d 470, 485, 245
Cal. Rptr. 412, 426-27 (1988).
49. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
50. Id. ("We emphasize, however, that we do not totally reject the market share
theory."). Other courts have recognized Collins as a variation of market-share
liability. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 509, 539 N.E.2d 1069,
1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 948, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
51. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
52. Id. at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49 ("We note that this method of recovery could
apply in situations which are factually similar to the DES cases.").
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Under the Wisconsin variant of market-share liability in
DES litigation, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case
against at least one defendant by alleging that: (1) the
plaintiff's mother took DES; (2) the DES caused the plaintiffs
injuries; (3) the defendant's conduct breached a legally rec-
ognized duty to the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant produced
or marketed the type (color, shape, markings, size, or other
characteristics) of DES taken by the plaintiffs mother or, if
this cannot be alleged, that the defendant produced or
marketed DES as a miscarriage preventative.53
Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case under either
a negligence or strict liability theory, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendants.54 A defendant can exculpate itself by
proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not
produce or market the subject DES either during the time
period the plaintiff was exposed to DES or in the relevant
geographical market area in which the plaintiff's mother
acquired the DES."55 The jury then apportions liability
among the unexculpated defendants using a comparative
negligence method that considers several factors, including
market share.56
3. The Washington variation-Shortly after the Wisconsin
decision, the Supreme Court of Washington, in Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories,57 developed a third version of market-
share liability. The Martin court specifically rejected the
California theory of market-share liability for two reasons.58
First, the theory fails to define a "substantial" share of the
market. 9 Second, the theory contains an "inherent distortion
of liability" when courts inflate defendants' market shares to
provide a full recovery for the plaintiff.6"
As a response, the Martin court developed the theory of
"market-share alternate liability." 1 Similar to the Wisconsin
53. Id. at 193-94, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
54. Id. at 195-98, 342 N.W.2d at 51-52.
55. Id. at 198, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
56. Id. at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
57. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
58. Id. at 602, 689 P.2d at 381.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 601, 689 P.2d at 380-81.
61. Id. at 602-07, 689 P.2d at 381-83.
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theory,62 this theory allows suit against a single defendant.'
As in the California and Wisconsin theories, defendants can
exculpate themselves.' 4
In contrast to the Wisconsin approach,65 this theory creates
a rebuttable presumption that the remaining defendants have
equal market shares and are proportionately liable.66 If all
of the defendants establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that their market shares amount to less than one hundred
percent, the plaintiff does not recover the entire judgment.67
The Washington variation was developed further in George
v. Parke-Davis.6" In George, the Washington Supreme Court
decided that the determination of market shares, including
whether to admit local, state, or national data, is within the
discretion of the trial court.69 The court also reaffirmed its
holding in Martin that liability is only several in nature, not
joint and several.7"
The Martin theory has been popular beyond Washington's
borders. Three courts outside Washington adopted its market-
share liability theory: a Massachusetts federal district court,v'
an Illinois state court of appeals, 2 and the Florida Supreme
Court.73 Because the Illinois Supreme Court rejected com-
pletely the theory of market-share liability, however, it reversed
the Illinois state court of appeals.7 4
62. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Indeed, the opinions are not only
similar, but verbatim in parts. Compare Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 604-05, 689 P.2d
at 382 with Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191-94, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49-50,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
63. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 604, 689 P.2d at 382.
64. Id. at 605, 689 P.2d at 383.
65. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
66. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605, 689 P.2d at 383.
67. Id. at 606, 689 P.2d at 383.
68. 107 Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987).
69. Id. at 593, 733 P.2d at 512.
70. Id. at 594-97, 733 P.2d at 513-15.
71. See McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526-27 (D. Mass.
1985).
72. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 18-19, 527 N.E.2d 333, 344
(1988), rev'd, 137 111. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
73. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 283 (Fla. 1990).
74. Smith, 137 Ill. 2d at 251, 560 N.E.2d at 337.
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B. New York and Florida Adopt Market-Share Liability
With the acceptance of market-share liability by both New
York75 and Florida, 76 one can no longer consider the theory to
be merely the legal equivalent of the latest fad from California.
Moreover, these cases are important in their own right. New
York's theory is the most expansive of any market-share
theory yet adopted.77  Meanwhile, Florida's theory was
applied almost immediately outside the DES context,78 which
is a significant development.
1. The New York variation-When it decided Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co.79 in 1989, New York's highest court could
have chosen to apply any one of the existing several formula-
tions of market-share liability" or even a concert of action
theory developed by the Michigan Supreme Court in a DES
case." Indeed, seven years earlier the New York court itself
had affirmed the judgment in a DES case based on a concert
of action theory. 2 Even with these extensions of traditional
tort law already available to the court, the decision was novel
enough that one judge sitting on the court-a judge who agreed
that market-share liability was appropriate" 3 -characterized
it as "a radical departure from fundamental tenets of tort
law." 4 As a result, the decision immediately drew attention
from outside the legal community. For example, an article in
the New York Times characterized Hymowitz as "one of the
most far-reaching product-liability rulings ever issued by an
75. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
76. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
77. See infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
79. 73 N.Y.2d 487,539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989).
80. Id. at 509-11, 539 N.E.2d at 1076-77, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49 (recognizing the
alternatives).
81. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 336-39, 343 N.W.2d 164, 175-76,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
82. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 584-85, 436 N.E.2d 182, 188-89,
450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782-83 (1982).
83. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 516, 539 N.E.2d at 1081, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 953
(Mollen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 520, 539 N.E.2d at 1083, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (Mollen, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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American court." 5  The case, not surprisingly, also has
provoked a fair amount of legal commentary 8
In Hymowitz, the court found that existing common-law
doctrines provided no relief for the plaintiff.8 7 The court
refused to apply the theory of alternative liability given (1) the
great number of possible manufacturers, (2) the corresponding
remote possibility that any particular manufacturer caused
the injury, (3) the lack of any real prospect of having all
possible tortfeasors before the court, and (4) the prospect that
the defendants would not be in any better position than the
plaintiffs to identify the responsible tortfeasors.8 8 It also
rejected the theory of concert of action because the record did
not contain evidence of an agreement, tacit or otherwise,
among the drug companies regarding the development or
marketing of DES. 9 The court next considered the modified
form of concert of action used in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.9 °
but refused to adopt it as the law of New York.9'
The court then considered and refused to adopt each of the
three extant versions of market-share liability.92 Instead,
unlike courts in other states, the New York Court of Appeals
adopted a theory that holds a manufacturer liable for damages
regardless of proof that its product did not cause the plaintiffs
injury.93 In so doing, New York created a more expansive
form of liability by enabling market-share liability to serve as
85. Greenhouse, Product-Liability Ruling Untouched, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1989,
at 11, col. 4 (nat'l ed.).
86. See, e.g., The Problem of the Indeterminate Defendant: Market Share
Liability Theory-Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 863 (1989)
(consisting of a symposium of three articles); Note, Market Share Liability New York
Style: Negligence in the Air?, 55 Mo. L. REV. 1047 (1990) (authored by Mike D.
Murphy); Comment, Market Share Liability-Did New York Go Too Far?: Hymowitz
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 363 (1990) (authored by William D. Wilson).
87. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
88. Id. at 506, 539 N.E.2d at 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
89. Id.
90. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 582, 436 N.E.2d 182, 187, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 781 (1982).
91. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948. The
court noted that Bichler was decided on the basis of an unusual jury instruction that
the defense counsel did not object to in that case. Id.
92. Id. at 509-11, 539 N.E.2d at 1076-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948-50.
93. Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court attempted to
limit the scope of its holding by noting that "the DES situation is a singular case"
involving an "unusual scenario." Id. at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
Such attempts to limit market-share liability can be quite ineffective. See infra notes
107-09 and accompanying text.
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more than a mere burden-shifting device.94 The stunning
aspect of the New York theory is that it denies a defendant
the opportunity to exculpate itself,95 which is an integral part
of each of the other three variants.9 6 A defendant's share of
the national market of DES for use during pregnancy deter-
mines, not as a rebuttable presumption but absolutely, its
proportion of the damages owed to the plaintiff.97
In developing its own version of market-share liability, the
Hymowitz court noted that its theory is not based on a belief
that, in the long run, liability will approximate causation.98
Furthermore, the court stated explicitly that the theory does
not provide a reasonable link between a defendant and the
risk it created toward a particular plaintiff.99 The court
offered this rationale for its theory:
Instead, we choose to apportion liability so as to correspond
to the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured by
the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the
public-at-large....
... [A defendant who sold DES for pregnancy use cannot
exculpate itself] because liability here is based on the over-
all risk produced, and not causation in a single case ....
It is merely a windfall for a producer to escape liability
solely because it manufactured a more identifiable pill, or
sold only to certain drugstores. These fortuities in no way
94. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924,
937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (noting that the theory only serves to shift the burden of
proof), 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
95. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The
only way for a defendant to exculpate itself under Hymowitz is to demonstrate that
it was not a member of the national market of DES sold for pregnancy use. Id. at 512
n.2, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 n.2, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950 n.2.
96. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145; Collins
v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 197-98,342 N.W.2d 37, 52, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 368, 382
(1984).
97. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511-12, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
98. Id. A professed goal of Sindell-type liability was to have liability approxi-
mate causation. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145; see also Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1074, 751 P.2d 470, 486, 245
Cal. Rptr. 412, 428 (1988).
99. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. This
approach defeats the Wisconsin Supreme Court's goal of providing a reasonable link
between the defendant and the risk created to a particular plaintiff. See Collins, 116
Wis. 2d at 191-92, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
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diminish the culpability of a defendant for marketing the
product, which is the basis of liability here.1"'
In this passage, the court mentions two kinds of exculpatory
evidence-evidence based on the type of pill ingested and
evidence based on the geographical area where the defendant
marketed a pill. A third kind of exculpatory evidence, which
the court neglects to discuss explicitly, is perhaps the most
fundamental-the time period when the plaintiffs mother
ingested the pills.10 1 The reasoning of the decision indicates
that the court also would disallow a defendant's attempt to
exculpate itself based on this type of evidence. A theory that
leads a court to hold defendants who marketed only blue pills
liable to plaintiffs injured only by red pills or to hold defen-
dants who marketed DES only in California liable to those
who purchased it only in New York, also would lead a court to
consider it a "mere windfall" or "fortuit[y]" if defendants that
marketed DES only after 1965 could exculpate themselves
from claims by the plaintiffs who were injured by DES mar-
keted before 1960. Because liability is not based on the
"single case," following the court's logic, it is irrelevant when
the defendant sold the DES, because the sale had nevertheless
contributed to the "over-all risk produced" to the "public-at-
large."
The concept of a market share, however, demands at least
three parameters-what the product was, where it was being
sold, and when it was sold. ' 2 If any of these three parame-
ters is missing, a measure of market share becomes conceptu-
ally meaningless. If New York adheres to its own logic, it
must calculate the national market share of a defendant based
on the defendant's share of DES for pregnancy use ever sold in
the United States.
100. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
Upjohn marketed a type of pill that was distinguishable from the type ingested by
the plaintiff. Id. at 523-24, 539 N.E.2d at 1085, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Mollen, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rexall Drug Co. had sold only to its own
drugstores, while the plaintiff had established only purchases from other stores. Id.
101. The timing of a sale of DES is mentioned as possible exculpatory evidence
in a number of other cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 19,
527 N.E.2d 333, 345 (1988), rev'd, 137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990); Burnside
v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 288-89, 505 A.2d 973, 986 (1985).
102. See, e.g., Note, DES Causation, supra note 8, at 1189-93 (recognizing these
factors); Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Torts, 36 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1983) (same);
cf. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (noting the
importance of time, geography, and especially product definition in antitrust cases).
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2. Florida adopts Washington's theory-In 1985, the Florida
Supreme Court refused to apply market-share liability in
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland."°3 The court stated that because
the plaintiff could identify several suppliers of the asbestos to
which he had been exposed, it did not find it necessary to
accept or reject a market-share theory.1" 4
Five years later, however, the court adopted Washington's
market-share alternate liability theory when it decided a DES
case, Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.' Although the court adopted
the theory, it set an additional requirement that reflected its
experience in Celotex. Before using the market-share theory,
"a plaintiff must make a showing that she has made a genuine
attempt to locate and to identify the manufacturer responsible
for her injury."0 6
In adopting market-share alternate liability, the Conley
court "recognized the unique circumstances surrounding the
injury suffered by the DES plaintiff."0 7 Courts in Florida,
however, wasted no time in expanding the use of market-share
liability beyond the DES context. On January 10, 1991, only
one day after the denial of a motion for rehearing in
Conley,' a federal district court in Florida relied on
Conley's market-share theory to reverse a summary judgment
for defendants in a product-liability case involving Factor VIII,
a blood plasma product used by hemophiliacs.' °9 Appar-
ently, the DES scenario is not as "unique" as some have
believed.
II. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS ON JUDICIAL POWER
After surveying the development of market-share liability,
it is reasonable to ask what the limits on judicial power in
imposing liability are under the American system of government.
103. 471 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1985).
104. Id. at 539.
105. 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990).
106. Id. In developing this requirement, the court apparently drew not only on
its own experience in Celotex, but also on similar proposals in the legal literature.
See id. at 285 (citing Note, The Application of a Due Diligence Requirement to Market
Share Theory in DES Litigation, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 771 (1986) (authored by
Thomas C. Willcox)).
107. Id. at 283.
108. See id. at 275.
109. See Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, Div. of Miles, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 193, 196
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
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Such an inquiry, in its broadest sense, easily deserves an
article or book of its own. Therefore, in this setting, I will
narrow the question to a brief examination of how the doc-
trines involving standing to sue in federal court and the
requirements of in personam jurisdiction interact with market-
share liability theory.
A. The Plaintiffs Standing to Sue in Federal Court
Although some market-share liability cases have been
litigated in federal courts,1 ° I question whether a federal
court, even one in New York, could adjudicate a case based on
the Hymowitz theory. Surely, this inability to apply Hymowitz
would be an exceptional situation because federal courts
sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state in
which they sit.' A plaintiff proceeding under the Hymowitz
theory, however, may lack standing to sue in federal court." 2
Under article III of the Constitution, a litigant must have
standing to invoke the power of a federal court." 3  The
standing doctrine serves a crucial role in our federal govern-
ment. As the Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe law of Art. III
standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation
of powers.""' In essence, standing doctrine defines the
judicially recognized boundary between adjudicative functions
and legislative or executive functions. The doctrine, therefore,
is designed "to prevent the virtually limitless spread ofjudicial
authority."'
110. See, e.g., Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
111. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
112. I recognize that the implications of the analysis that follows also could extend
to other situations involving indeterminate defendants, but I will confine this
discussion to Hymowitz because I believe that it offers the starkest example.
113. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); see also E. CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 51 (1989).
114. Allen, 468 U.S. 737, 752; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)
(stating that standing focuses on 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society"). Several works on standing address this point at
length. See, e.g., Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983); Logan, Standing to Sue: A
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37.
115. Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Justice Scalia has made the same point. See Scalia, supra note 114, at 881 (stating
that standing doctrine prevents the "overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance").
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In a recent case, the Supreme Court stated: "[S]tanding...
has a core component derived directly from the Constitution.
A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be re-
dressed by the requested relief."116 A clearly distinct, "fairly
traceable" causation test for standing evolved 117 only recently,
in 1984.118
Obviously, what constitutes a "fairly traceable" cause is open
to interpretation." 9  Recently, several federal courts of ap-
peals and federal district courts have articulated the test in
terms of "but for" causation. 2 ° The implication for a plaintiff
116. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (emphasis added). One commentator argues that the
causation requirement in particular serves the goal of maintaining the separation of
powers. See Logan, supra note 114, at 46.
117. "Evolved" is a generous term in describing standing jurisprudence, an area
of judicial decision making that one commentator has described as "permeated with
sophistry." 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d ed. 1983).
Other commentators have called various decisions in this area "bizarre," L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-18, at 134 (2d ed. 1988), "erratic, even bizarre,"
J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 1 (1978), and "perverse," Chayes, The Supreme Court,
1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 18 (1982).
118. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 113, at 64 (citing Allen). Previously, the Court
treated causation and redressability as one inquiry, but courts now recognize them
as distinct inquiries. Id.; see also Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d
1086, 1093 n.16 (6th Cir. 1985); Martin v. International Dryer Corp., 637 F. Supp.
101, 102 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
119. Cf Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Aguilar, 579 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) ("Legal causation is a kind of shorthand used by courts to explain results
reached by the application of a largely unspecified set of moral, economic, legal and
social principles to the competing interests involved.") (interpreting a contract);
Robinson, supra note 8, at 713 ("As every freshman student of tort law soon learns
to his discomfort, 'causation' is an inscrutably vague notion, susceptible to endless
philosophical argument, as well as practical manipulation."); Zwier, "Cause in Fact"
in Tort Law-A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 769,
776 (1982) ('Each trier of fact must deduce a cause from evidentiary facts, and this
deduction is dependent upon the trier's past experience.").
120. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
("[T]he exemption challenged here might not even constitute 'but for' causation.");
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir. 1989) ("But
for the government's refusal to revoke the League's tax-exempt status, then, the
League, as a practical matter, would have been unable to sponsor the ... debates
which [allegedly] caused the injury. . . ."); FDIC v. Morley, 867 F.2d 1381, 1388 (11th
Cir. 1989) ("[T]he appropriate analysis considers whether 'but for' the FDIC's infusion
of capital [the plaintiff would have been injured]."); Martin, 637 F. Supp. at 102-03
("A plaintiff establishes a sufficient causal connection between injury and challenged
action if he can make a reasonable showing that the alleged injury would not have
occurred 'but for' the defendant's challenged conduct.").
Several cases dealing with this issue seem to rule out allowing standing for a
cause of action based on Hymowitz. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809
F.2d 794, 818 (D.C. Cir 1987) ("[The injury] is alleged almost as an abstraction,
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relying on Hymowitz is clear: Because the Hymowitz theory
has discarded the notion of "traceability" between the
plaintiffs injury and the defendant's conduct in the individual
case,12' the plaintiff cannot meet the standing requirements
of article III and the case will fall outside the jurisdiction of a
federal court. Not only does this mean that a plaintiff could
not properly file the case in federal court, but it also would
prevent a defendant from removing the case from state court
to federal court because removal jurisdiction requires that the
case fall within the original jurisdiction of a federal court.
122
Already, a federal district court has ruled that the plaintiffs
in a product-liability suit lacked standing to sue when seeking
recovery under both concert of action and market-share
liability theories.1 23  The inquiry is independent of whether
or not state law recognizes the injury.
24
because the complaint omits allegation of any direct link, causal or otherwise,
between the asserted harm and the challenged actions.") (Buckley, J., concurring);
Northwest Airlines v. FAA, 795 F.2d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The injury
requirement will not be satisfied simply because a chain of events can be hypothe-
sized in which the action challenged eventually leads to actual injury."); Coker
v. Bowen, 715 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 1989) ('The mere possibility that causation
is present is not enough . . ").
121. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. The court noted that it
adopted the theory with 'full knowledge that it concedes the lack of a logical link
between liability and causation in a single case." Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73
N.Y.2d 487, 513 n.3, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 n.3, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950 n.3, cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). To the extent that Hymowitz recognizes the injury itself
as the "over-all risk produced" to the "public-at-large," id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078,
541 N.Y.S.2d at 950, there is not a problem with traceability. There is, however, still
a problem. Such an injury would not be cognizable because it does not meet the
requirement that the injury be 'distinct and palpable," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501 (1975), and a 'personal" injury, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1988); see, e.g., Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881
F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) ('A suit may be removed to federal district court only
if it could have been brought there originally.").
123. See Herlihy v. Ply-Gem Indus., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1282, 1290-91 (D. Md.
1990). Although Herlihy reaches the right conclusion, I believe its analysis is faulty
because it examines state law in a manner far more appropriate for deciding a motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) than in a manner appropriate for.
standing. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
124. Even under the old 'legal interest" test, see Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939), federal courts were not bound
to the decisions of state courts recognizing injury for the purposes of standing in
federal court. In a case decided the same term as Tennessee Electric, Justice
Frankfurter stated: "[I]t by no means follows that a state court ruling on adequacy
of legal interest is binding here .... Nor can recognition by a state court of ... an
undifferentiated, general interest confer jurisdiction on us." Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 466 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). Even earlier, the Supreme
Court had recognized that 'state law cannot alter the essential character or function
of a federal court." Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931); see also Byrd
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B. In Personam Jurisdiction over Defendants
The Constitution requires that a court have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant:
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction
flows ... from the Due Process Clause. The personal
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty. Thus, the test for personal
jurisdiction requires that "the maintenance of the suit...
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S.
310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457,
463 (1940).125
In deciding whether a court may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant, the Supreme Court has
developed a test evaluating the defendant's "minimum
contacts" with the forum state.126 The Court has stated that
these minimum contacts "must have a basis in 'some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.' 7
127
v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958) (discussing the continuing
vitality of Herron on this point).
Under the current "injury in fact" test, see Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1970), it is even clearer that the standing
inquiry is independent of state law: "Standing, which derives from the article III case
or controversy requirement, is met when the plaintiff can demonstrate 'injury in fact.'
To what extent that injury is legally cognizable under the laws of the various jurisdic-
tions is a separate inquiry." In re Asbestos School Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 422, 425 n.1
(E.D. Pa. 1984), amended on other grounds, 107 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (citation
omitted). Therefore, the "injury in fact" requirement establishes a floor for what
injuries a federal court can recognize, which is why the inquiry is independent of
state law. But see Herlihy, 752 F. Supp. at 1290-91 (analyzing state law in a federal
standing inquiry).
125. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (footnote omitted).
126. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-55 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
127. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The "purposeful
availment" concept is over thirty years old and can be traced back to Hanson. 357
U.S. at 253.
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The minimum contacts test could prevent a court from
exercising jurisdiction over a defendant in a variety of market-
share liability scenarios in which the defendant would be
unable to exculpate itself otherwise.12 Generally, the bur-
den of proving the existence of jurisdiction in these situations
involving long-arm jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff.'29 To
take the most extreme example, a plaintiff relying on the
Hymowitz theory, which allows no exculpation, still would
need to demonstrate that a defendant had purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York.
By contesting jurisdiction, a defendant that had never operated
in New York could still avoid the most liability-expanding
aspects of the Hymowitz theory.
Even under theories that allow exculpation, if the relevant
market is defined as an area exceeding or wholly outside of
the forum state, a defendant might be unable to exculpate
itself and yet escape liability by contesting jurisdiction. For
example, if the relevant market encompasses three states and
a particular defendant sold in only one of them-but not in the
forum state-it would be unable to exculpate itself but could
successfully challenge jurisdiction.
The Constitution's restrictions on personal jurisdiction
constitute only the bare minimum that courts must recognize.
In adjudication involving nonresident defendants, a state can
impose additional restraints on its courts through its "long-
arm" jurisdiction statute. For example, the statute in New
York provides additional restrictions on exercising personal
jurisdiction.8 0  The retroactive application of long-arm
128. See Note, Best Remedy, supra note 8, at 161-63 (discussing a similar point
regarding cross-complaints).
129. See, e.g., Madera v. Hall, 717 F. Supp. 812, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (applying
Florida law), aff d in part and vacated in part sub nom. Maclara v. Hall, 916 F.2d
1510 (11th Cir. 1990); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Systonetics, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1161, 1164-
65 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law); Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125,
127 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying New York law).
130. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 1990); see also Talbot v. Johnson
Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827, 829-30, 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1029, 527 N.Y.S.2d 729,
731 (1988) ("[Tlhe New York long-arm statute (CPLR 302) does not provide for in
personam jurisdiction in every case in which due process would permit it."); Banco
Ambrosiano, S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 464 N.E.2d 432,
435, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66-67 (1984) ('[The long-arm statute] does not go as far as is
constitutionally permissible [in establishing jurisdiction over nonresidents]. Thus, a
situation can occur in which the necessary contacts to satisfy due process are present,
but in personam jurisdiction will not be obtained in this State because the statute
does not authorize it.").
Market-Share Liability
778 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
statutes presents another barrier in some instances. Generally,
courts have held that when a long-arm statute operates under
a theory of the defendant's "implied consent" to be sued in the
state, such statutes cannot apply retroactively.13 ' Indeed,
this argument was made successfully in Conley v. Boyle Drug
Co. 3 2 The plaintiff offered no proof that two of the defen-
dants were operating in Florida at the time her mother
consumed DES. 3 3 Therefore, no personal jurisdiction existed
under the then-current Florida long-arm statute. 34  The
court held that the broader Florida statute in effect when the
suit was filed could not apply retroactively to the defendants
and ordered these two defendants dismissed from the
case. 135
III. RESTRAINING THE COURTS THROUGH FEDERAL
LEGISLATION UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Given inconsistent standards among states, overdeterrence
results as companies can be held liable for damages that are
several multiples greater than their "actual" liability.'36
Consider the following example: All of Company A's sales
supply 60% of a particular product in a state. These sales rep-
resent 5% of the national market. If this state determines
market-share liability on a state-wide basis, Company A will
be held responsible for 60% of all damages, paying in full what
are in essence its actual damages. But in any other state that
adopts a national market-share standard, Company A also will
be liable for its 5% share of the national market. Company A's
liability will thus exceed the damage it actually caused.
Overdeterrence, therefore, is one consequence of inconsistent
apportionment schemes, resulting in a reduction in the
131. See, e.g., Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453,459,463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 98,
101 (1967); Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481, 483 (Miss. 1966).
132. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
133. Id. at 287-89.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 288-89.
136. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 8, at 1656-58; Note, DES Causation, supra note
8, at 1192-93; Comment, Into the Quagmire, supra note 8, at 237; Casenote,
California Expands Tort Liability, supra note 8, at 1038-39.
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marketing of products as well as an increase in their prices. 37
Overdeterrence also creates an incentive to shift products to
separate corporate subsidiaries to minimize chances that
liability for a single product would deplete not only all of that
product's profits, but also profits from other product lines.
138
Such behavior sacrifices efficiencies that might otherwise
result from integration. 39  As an alternative, a company
might forego development or production of the risky product
completely. For example, several vaccine companies have
chosen to leave the market rather than face such incalculable
possible liability. 4 '
Hymowitz also reduces the incentive for defendants to retain
or develop information concerning the sale of goods,' an
incentive fostered by each of the previous market-share cases,
because the information no longer has exculpatory value. The
case removes the motivation to have such information avail-
able for future use.
Given the common-law heritage of the tort action and the
common-law expertise of the states, primary responsibility for
reforming market-share liability should rest with the
states.'42 The states, however, may develop inconsistent
standards or standards that impose costs on other states,
thereby interfering with interstate commerce. When this
occurs, the federal government may resolve the situation
through its powers under the commerce clause.
14 3
137. See S. REP. No. 356, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990); 137 CONG. REC. S3260-61
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
138. See Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 39-
49 (1986).
139. See id. at 5.
140. For a discussion of the impact of such withdrawal on remaining vaccine
companies, see Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 179, 561 A.2d 511, 523
(1989).
141. See Note, DES Causation, supra note 8, at 1202 (discussing this incentive).
142. See Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal
Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389, 461 (1984).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Even if one conceives of a state's tort regime as
a form of safety regulation, this alone would not prevent the federal government from
invoking the commerce clause. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.
520, 530 (1959) (striking down Illinois safety regulations because they violate the
dormant commerce clause by imposing heavy costs on interstate commerce).
A Uniform Market Share Liability Act has been proposed to address the issue of
inconsistent state standards. See Leighton, Market Share Liability: The Need for a
Uniform Market Share Liability Act, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 83, 85-87. For a discussion
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As an effort to regulate interstate commerce, U.S. Senator
Robert Kasten introduced a federal product-liability bill on
March 13, 1991.14' The bill's sponsors do not intend to
occupy the field of product liability, but seek to make discrete
improvements on the existing tort system. 145 The bill's most
significant provisions include:
(1) establishing procedures encouraging expedited
settlements and alternative dispute resolution;
146
(2) setting a national standard for imposing liability on
a defendant who sold, but did not manufacture, a
product;
147
(3) setting a national standard for awarding punitive
damages;
14
(4) establishing a national statute of limitations for
product-liability actions;
49
(5) setting a national standard for coordinating
product-liability awards and workers' compensa-
tion awards;5 0
(6) eliminating joint liability for noneconomic dam-
ages;' 5' and
(7) providing a defense against a claimant who is pri-
marily responsible for an injury and was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.
5 2
of the relative merits of state and federal action on this question, see Reed &
Watkins, supra note 142; Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 8, at 973-74.
144. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3255-60 (daily ed.
Mar. 13, 1991). Proposals for federal regulation of product-liability law are not new.
See, e.g., Schwartz & Bares, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law: A Solution
that Will Work, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 351 (1984) (discussing reform efforts); Twerski, A
Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas
for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575 (1985) (proposing a limited federal
approach).
145. See S. 640, supra note 144, § 301, 137 CONG. REC. 83258.
146. Id. §§ 201-02, 137 CONG. REd. S3257-58.
147. Id. § 302, 137 CONG. REC. S3258.
148. Id. § 303, 137 CONG. REC. S3258-59.
149. Id. § 304, 137 CONG. REC. S3259.
150. Id. § 305, 137 CONG. REC. S3259.
151. Id. § 306, 137 CONG. REd. S3259-60.
152. Id. § 307, 137 CONG. REC. 83260.
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Among the bill's aims are to improve risk assessment 153 and
to promote fairness.
154
Consistent with these goals, adding a small section to the
bill could prevent the problems that arise when courts attempt
to apportion market-share liability on a national or regional
basis. For this reason, I propose the following amendment
dealing with market-share liability:"'
LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINING DAMAGES
FOR MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY
(a) When apportioning damages among manufacturers
in a manner that includes as relevant the share of the
market of goods sold by each manufacturer, the
market considered as relevant shall not exceed the
boundaries of the State, possession, or territory in
which the product was purchased.
(b) If the injury is not attributable to a single pur-
chase of a product and all of the purchases did not
take place in the same State, possession, or territory,
then the relevant market shall be the State, posses-
sion, or territory in which the consumer made the last
purchase.6
153. As Senator Kasten stated: "The uniformity we seek will make the
assessment of risk easier, and thus help to stabilize the insurance market." 137
CONG. REC. S3255 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
154. Id. at S3256.
155. Indeed, Senator Kasten included more stringent provisions dealing with
market-share liability in earlier versions of federal product-liability reform efforts.
See, e.g., S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4, 9, 128 CONG. REC. 13,774, 13,776 (1982).
Proposals for legislation dealing with market-share liability began soon after the
Sindell court developed the theory. See, e.g., Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 8,
at 964-74 (designing a legislative framework for DES claims and perhaps similar
situations dealing with indeterminate defendants); Note, Market Share Liability for
DES (Diethylstilbestrol) Injury: A New High Water Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L.
REV. 432, 446-49 (1981) (authored by Barbara J. Koperski) (advocating a federal
insurance plan for products); Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative
Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003, 1037-42 (authored by Cynthia L. Chase).
156. There are basically four methods of determining the appropriate boundary
in this situation involving multiple purchases: One can determine the boundary
based on the first or last place the product was purchased, the place where the
plurality of sales occurred, or the purchases can be pro-rated among the different
jurisdictions. I chose the last purchase option because the most recent records would
be the most complete. In addition, this option conserves judicial resources.
782 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
Although this amendment does not address the problems
involving constitutional interpretation raised in Part II, it does
serve the narrow goal of preventing courts in different
jurisdictions from imposing penalties that may be individually
rational but, because of inconsistent liability schemes, yield a
cumulatively irrational result. To the extent that the amend-
ment prevents courts from proceeding because of insufficient
data, this is not an indication of a failure on the part of the
judiciary to achieve justice. Rather, I believe that it is more
appropriate to see it as an indication that the judiciary is not
the appropriate branch of government from which to seek
resolution of such claims.
15 7
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the theory of market-share liability offers
an interesting perspective on the role of the judiciary because
the theory stretches traditional limits that have restrained the
exercise of judicial power. For common-law courts to fashion
new remedies for new injuries is, of course, nothing new. The
problems that market-share liability highlights are whether
those new remedies exceed the power delegated to the federal
judiciary by the Constitution or violate the notions of fairness
and due process contained in the contemporary understanding
of the requirements for in personam jurisdiction. My efforts
here have been to raise and examine the question, not to
provide a definitive answer.
Moving to a more practical problem, the development of the
different versions of market share liability also illuminates
one of the features of living in our federalist system-that
under certain circumstances individually rational decisions by
157. Congress has already demonstrated that it can devise an administrative
scheme for compensating victims that could be adapted to these circumstances. See
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -17 (1988).
The situation has deteriorated to the point that even the manufacturers of products
are asking for such a program rather than face incalculable liability. The associate
general counsel for Johnson & Johnson, Inc. has supported such a program. See Fine,
A Personal Perspective from the "Manufacturer," 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 899, 903
(1989). Several such proposals already appear in the legal literature. See, e.g., Reed
& Watkins, supra note 142; Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 8; Note, Best
Remedy, supra note 8, at 172-76.
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states will not result in a rational decision for the nation as a
whole. The legislation that I have proposed seeks to solve this
problem through the use of a single standard to replace the
inconsistent state standards that are the source of the
problem.

